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Abstract 
A multitude of factors affect the ability of South Africans to access the essential 
medicines, intellectual property (IP) is one of them. This dissertation considers some of 
opportunities open to South Africa through international IP flexibilities, which are aimed at 
safeguarding public health rights against the sometimes access-restricting effects of patent 
right monopolies. Potential pitfalls are also highlighted, noting strategies for South Africa 
to avoid the worst of them. The paper begins by giving an overview of the way in which 
patents affect access to medicines, and contending that the time for making the proposed 
amendments is now.  Specific proposals for the patent framework in South Africa should 
be considered to i) tighten the standards of patentability to ensure that only those medical 
inventions which are truly inventive and demonstrate therapeutic improvements are 
rewarded with patent protection, ii) introducing opportunities for pre- and post-grant 
opposition, iii) streamlining the compulsory licensing framework to encourage use on 
public health grounds, and iv) resist introducing measures which go beyond what is 
required under South Africa‟s international commitments, such as data exclusivity and 
patent linkage. Read together, the chapters of this dissertation encourage a shift in public 
policy making by the Government of South Africa, towards a proactive prioritisation of the 
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Introduction 
17 years have passed since the Members of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) brought into force the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS) Agreement, as part of a package of 17 agreements setting up the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO). Amongst other things, TRIPS requires countries to adopt minimum 
standards of intellectual property (IP) protection. For many countries, this meant extending 
patent protection for pharmaceutical products for the first time; for others it meant 
extending the life of patents which were already granted. Some developing and least 
developed countries were granted transition periods for implementing the full range of 
standards.  In South Africa, where pharmaceutical patent protection did exist for both 
products and processes prior to 1995, the life of a patent was extended from 16 to 20 years.  
Prior to TRIPS coming into force in 1995, as well as in the years that followed, 
many governments and public health organisations became increasingly concerned that the 
Agreement, which has strengthened protections on potentially life-saving medicines in 
many countries, was restricting abilities to respond to public health emergencies by 
accessing the essential, life-saving medicines, because of the high prices patent monopolies 
afford. 
This crisis came to a head in the late 1990s and early 2000s, and culminated in 
WTO Members agreeing to the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health 
(the „Doha Declaration‟) in 2001, which affirmed agreement by Members that  
“the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent Members from taking 
measures to protect public health. Accordingly, while reiterating our commitment 
to the TRIPS Agreement, we affirm that the Agreement can and should be 
interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO Members' right to 
protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for all”.
1
  
In a broad sense, the Doha Declaration does not provide new flexibilities for countries per 
se, but is rather a clarification on the rights that have been contained in TRIPS since its 
inception. When considering the specific ways South African laws should be amended to 
                                                             
1










Page 7 of 73 
 
support access to medicines, therefore, we look to the TRIPS Agreement itself, which 
spells out a number of ways to use the existing IP framework in a way which supports 
public health. We refer to these as „flexibilities‟ because they provide, in some 
circumstances, exceptions to the exclusive right of patent holders to monopolise the use of 
their inventions, and because they provide a degree of openness for countries to determine, 
according to local needs, exactly how to implement certain provisions.  
Over the years, a number of international organisations have called for developing 
countries to implement the TRIPS flexibilities. The WHO Global Strategy and Plan of 
Action, for example, urges Member States to „take into account, where appropriate, the 
impact on public health when considering adopting or implementing more extensive 
intellectual property protection than is required by [TRIPS], without prejudice to the 
sovereign rights of Member States.‟
2
 To that end, much has been written around strategies 
to assist developing countries to make the most of available TRIPS flexibilities to achieve 
goals around securing stronger access to medicines
3
 – this dissertation tailors some of the 
most important of this strategies f or the uniquely South African situation.  
While these sentiments have, by and large, been supported by local public health 
organisations over time, it is in late 2011 that the HIV advocacy organisation in South 
Africa, the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC), in conjunction with the constitutional 
health and education rights organisation, Section 27, began to seriously agitate for the 
South African Government to recognise that the time has come to implement these TRIPS 
flexibilities.
 4
 The „Fix the Patents Law‟ campaign went live on 26 January 2012,
5
 and calls 
                                                             
2 Paragraph 36, (5.2)(b), WHO, World Health Assembly, „Global Strategy and plan of action on public 
health, innovation and intellectual property‟ 2008. 
3 See ,for example, Avafia, T, Berger J and Hartzenberg T, „The ability of select sub-Saharan countries to 
utilise TRIPS flexibilities and competition law to ensure a sustainable supply of essential medicines: a study 
of producing and importing countries‟ Trade Law Centre for Southern Africa (TRALAC) 2006; IPR 
Commission, „Patent reform‟ Integrating Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy, UK 
Government; Correa C, „Guidelines for the examination of pharmaceutical patents: developing a public health 
perspective‟ WHO-ICTSD-UNCTAD Working Paper (2007); El Said, M, „A policy guide for negotiators and 
implementers in the WHO Eastern Mediterranean region‟ ICTSD/WHO, 2010; Kettler, E and Collins C, IPR 
Commission „Study paper 2b: Using innovative action to meet global health needs through existing 
intellectual property regimes‟ UK Government; Musungu, S and Oh, C, „The use of flexibilities in TRIPS by 
developing countries: can they promote access to medicines?‟ Study 4C, Commission on Intellectual Property 
Rights, Innovation and Public Health, WHO (2005); Thorpe, P „Study paper 7: study on the implementation 
of the TRIPS Agreement by developing countries‟ IPR Commission.  
4 See TAC media release, „The Treatment Action Campaign calls on government to amend South Africa‟s 










Page 8 of 73 
 
on the South African Government to finally make use of the flexibilities under international 
law by enshrining them into national law. The proposed changes centre on reviewing the 
patent examination process to tighten the criteria for patentability and introduce pre and 
post grant opposition procedures, and clarifying the methods for granting compulsory 
licences on public health grounds.  
This dissertation aims to expand on those Campaign proposals. It identifies the 
South African legislation which needs to be changed, and examines the legal basis under 
TRIPS; the Constitution; human rights law: and other international legal instruments to 
make such changes. The dissertation also draws on a much wider literature to examine the 
social and economic arguments for and against such changes, and to develop a critical legal 
and policy analysis of the changes at a more nuanced level. The experiences of other 
countries in implementing specific TRIPS flexibilities provide particularly useful case 
studies to guide South Africa while it considers exactly how it will implement the 
measures, according to the local legal framework, and to suit local needs.  
The first chapter answers the broad questions behind the proposals: why South 
Africa should make these changes; what are the changes; how these changes are supported 
by international law; how to implement l cally; how the changes would benefit public 
health; and why the time to make the changes is now. It also touches on the benefits of 
incorporating human rights into the advocacy for these changes.  
The second chapter describes the deleterious practice of evergreening in the field of 
pharmaceutical patents. It goes on to explain how amending the Patents Act, by introducing 
stricter grounds for granting a patent in South Africa, can lead the way in fighting against 
evergreening, and associated longer patent monopolies.   
The third chapter argues for the introduction of pre- and post-grant opposition 
against patent applications. Introducing opportunities for pre-grant opposition will improve 
the quality of patents granted in South Africa, as more evidence is brought to the attention 
of examiners by third parties during the decision-making process. Post grant opposition 
opportunities would act as a safeguard if earlier Chapter 2 suggested measures do not result 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
5
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in a correct determination as to patentability. The measures in this chapter are also aimed at 
stemming evergreening.  
The fourth chapter examines how the compulsory licensing framework should be 
amended in South Africa to facilitate acquisition of licenses to manufacture or import 
patented medicines on expanded public health grounds. The amendments should 
incorporate a simplified, administrative framework to ensure that non-government parties 
are more easily able to apply for and pursue compulsory licenses in South Africa.  
The fifth chapter explores the so-called „TRIPS Plus‟ practices of data exclusivity 
(providing protection on test data submitted to regulatory agencies for the purposes of 
gaining marketing approval) and patent linkage (requiring regulatory agencies to consider 
the patent status of drugs before granting market approval), arguing that South Africa 
should avoid incorporating these into national law. While these are not TRIPS flexibilities, 
like the other mechanisms discussed in the dissertation, they have been included as a 
chapter because they are IP standards which are becoming increasingly common in 
international trade agreements. It is therefore important to highlight the detrimental impacts 
of these mechanisms now, as it is likely that the South African Government will be 
pressured, in international trade agreements and elsewhere, to incorporate them, if it has 
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Chapter 1: Making the case for implementing the TRIPS flexibilities to protect and 
promote access to medicines 
The TRIPS flexibilities provide safeguard for the ability of all WTO Members to 
address public good objectives, by providing exceptions to the monopoly rights of patent 
holders. While particular emphasis, in this dissertation and elsewhere, is made on 
flexibilities of special application and availability for developing countries, it is important 
to note that by and large,
6
 they are open to countries at all stages of development.  
How does patent law affect access to medicines? 
To bring it to its simplest, there are two important ways in which patent law has the 
potential to restrict access. The first is by creating protections on existing drugs, which give 
patent holders exclusive control to licence, manufacture and distribute their product. The 
lack of competition on many patented drugs inevitably leads to high prices, meaning that a 




The second important way patent law affects access is by influencing the kind of 
innovation which is undertaken in the first place. The IP model engrained under TRIPS 
requires countries to reward innovation with the exclusive right to exploit an invention 
under a patent. But when countries extend this reward to incremental innovations (which 
represent little to no therapeutic improvement over existing therapies), the incentive to 
make major medical advances for developing countries without large demand-driven 
markets declines. Because TRIPS sets the minimum standards for IP protection, while at 
the same time provides flexibilities in its implementation, this dissertation focuses on how 
South Africa should strike the balance to enhance access to medicines, while at the same 
time living up to its international commitments. 
Focusing on the patent framework as a way of enhancing access to medicines is not 
without its detractors. Critics of a forward looking and flexible patent framework for 
                                                             
6 There are a few exceptions – for example transition periods and Doha Paragraph 6 solutions only extend to 
developing and least developed countries (discussed in Chapter 4).  
7 „Essential medicines‟ in this dissertation should be understand to align with the WHO „Model List of 
Essential Medicines‟, which comprises of a core list, representing minimum medicine needs for a basic 
healthcare system, and a complimentary list, comprising essential medicines for priority diseases. 
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developing countries often argue that intellectual property protections are not the main 
barrier to better access to medicines in poor regions of the world. They argue that the lack 
of access to medicines in developing countries is the result of a wide range of factors, 
mostly to do with misplaced government priorities, policy failures, and/or corruption.
8
 One 
critic complains bluntly of the access to medicines movement, „[l]aying blame for the 
problem on the WTO and the TRIPS Agreement is overly simplistic and wrong, and does 
nothing to alleviate the crisis.‟
9
  
This dissertation does not seek to argue that changing the Patents Act in such a way 
as proposed is the only, or indeed the most important way of enhancing access to 
medicines. This author acknowledges, and would not seek to underplay, the importance of 
other factors affecting access, including, inter alia, the slow registration of medicines in 
developing countries; inefficiencies in procurement and budgeting; the presence or absence 
of a viable generics industry; human resources constraints; and wider health system 
distribution and capacity. But a patent regime which is sensitive to public health needs 
should certainly be part of the drive for better access.  
It has also been pointed out by other critics that because medications are not widely 
patented in Africa
10
; patents, therefore, d  not represent a barrier to access.
11
 Why not 
simply exploit all the unpatented medical inventions in Africa? While such a strategy is 
worthy of further attention, as it could potentially result in near-term affordable access to a 
number of medications for a number of important illnesses, it is not the focus of this 
dissertation. Briefly however, it is worth addressing these arguments. Those studies finding 
low rates of patenting in Africa do not take into account the particular distributions of 
patent protections against the most medically relevant and marketable drugs in countries. 
                                                             
8 See, for example, Kogan, L, „Brazil's IP Opportunism Threatens U.S. Private Property Rights, The 
University of Miami Inter-American Law Review, Vol. 38, No. 1 (Fall, 2006), p 56.  
9 The International Intellectual Property Institute, „Patent protection and access to HIV/AIDS pharmaceuticals 
in Sub-Saharan Africa‟ A report prepared for the World Intellectual Property Organization 
http://www.wipo.int/about-ip/en/studies/pdf/iipi_hiv.pdf [Accessed 4 January 2012]. 
10 One 2004 patent survey found that in 65 lower and middle income countries, patenting of the 319 
medicines on the WHO‟s Model List of Essential Medicines list is rare, sitting at 1.4 per cent (source: 
Attaran A, „How do patents and economic policies affect access to essential medicines in developing 
countries?‟ Health Affairs 23, no.3 (2004):155-166). Another survey found that in a theoretically possible 795 
cases of patentable ARVs in 53 African countries, only 21.6 per cent actually exist (source: Attaran A and 
Gillespie-White, L, „Do patents for antiretroviral drugs constrain access to AIDS treatment in Africa?‟ 
Journal of the American Medical Association Vol. 286 No.15 (2001). 
11
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For example, every three drug ARV cocktail is blocked by patents in South Africa, with the 
majority of remaining ARVs also patent protected.
12
  
Such a strategy, furthermore, is unlikely to yield the same long-term positive effects 
of a revised, flexible patent framework. It is arguable whether drug companies, with their 
strong history of asserting their interests,
13
 would not simply respond to such a trend by 
recognising that there is some kind of a market, and then stepping up their patenting and 
prosecuting behaviour in Africa as a response. This is not to say that unpatented medicines 
should not be exploited to enhance access to medicines in South Africa – indeed this option 
should be exploited where it is available – but this dissertation is directed rather, at 
achieving a longer-term patent framework which is supportive of only true innovation, and 
which provides the flexibility for exceptions on private monopoly rights to be made on 
public interest grounds.  
Political imperatives 
The reasons for taking these proposals forward at this point in time lie on a mix of 
legal and social grounds, as well as political: taking the Government to task for 
commitments it has made, and in order to fulfil its constitutional as well as public 
commitments.  
Making changes to the Patents Act in South Africa should represent, for the 
Government, one straightforward way of achieving better access to medicines with 
minimal political and economic costs. It requires minimal political buy-in because such 
proposed flexibilities are specifically provided for under international law. From history, 
we see that many developed countries have, and will most likely continue, to take steps to 
discourage, challenge, and even punish developing countries for making use of TRIPS 
flexibilities.
14
 However, if implementation is carefully managed to reflect the intentions of 
the TRIPS Agreement, such measures are easily defendable under international law. This 
                                                             
12 Faunce, T „Global intellectual property protection of “innovative” pharmaceuticals' in Globalization and 
health: challenges for health law and bioethics, (Bennett B and Tomossy G, eds) p 101.  
13 For a discussion on the development of increased patenting and enforcement activities by patent right 
holders, see Hall, B, „Exploring the patent explosion‟ Essays in Honor of Edwin Mansfield Part 4, 195-208, 
Springer (2005). 
14 For an overview of pressure by developing countries see Skyes, A „TRIPS, pharmaceuticals, developing 
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thesis attempts to set out suggestions for implementation which can help South Africa 
realise its public health objectives, while at the same time remain compliant with 
international commitments on health, intellectual property and trade.  
Aside from social and economic arguments in favour of making these amendments 
at any point in time, there are other indications that the time to act is now. World Health 
Organisation adviser, Dr Zafar Mirza has well articulated that there are several reasons for 
renewed concern about intellectual property among the UN organizations, chief among 
these the fact that „diseases are becoming more difficult to treat and the available health 
tools, be it medicines or diagnostics, are becoming "increasingly blunt", thus requiring new 
medicines that are governed by strong and lengthy patent regimes‟.
15
 
In considering proposed amendments to the Patents Act in 2002, which sought to 
introduce an administrative procedure to access the provisions of compulsory licensing, 
rather than the judicial provisions as then provided for, the DTI put forward a number of 
reasons why the proposals were unnecessary, at that point in time. Chief amongst these was 
that efforts to implement changes in line with the Doha Declaration would be premature, 
because „the exact nature of these efforts... still needs to be negotiated and may result in 
changes to the TRIPS Agreement that can be implemented once negotiations have been 
concluded.‟
16
 While the DTI might have argued in 2002 that exactly what was envisaged 
by the meaning of the original TRIPS flexibilities, as elaborated upon with the Doha 
Declaration, this argument stands up less well today. A body of practice (in the form of 
examples by other countries) has since emerged to indicate the kinds of compulsory 
licensing practices which are acceptable and effective, and adequately satisfy requirements 
of due process under TRIPS.  
Although the Government has not publicly announced a timeframe for the 
commencement of a process to review and implement TRIPS flexibilities into the Patents 
                                                             
15 Third World Network, „Use TRIPS flexibilities to reduce HIV drug prices, urges UN bodies‟ 18 March 
2011 http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/health.info/2011/health20110305.htm [Accessed 4 January 2012].  
16 DTI submission on the Proposed amendments to the Patents Act, presented to the Standing Committee on 
Private Members' Legislative Proposals and Special Petitions, 19 June 2002 














 it has indicated in a number of forums its intention that a review may be up-coming. 
The DTI reportedly wrote in 2011 to TAC and Section 27 as follows: 
„The Government is developing an Intellectual Property Policy (IP Policy) which 
will also address access to medicines and public health issues… The IP Policy will 
also establish a framework for legislative reform across all areas of IP policy to 
ensure a consistent approach that contributes positively to the economic and social 
interest of South Africa.  
The Policy will provide clarity as to which sections of the Patents Act 57 of 1978 
and the Medicines Control and Related Substances Act 101 of 1965 require 
amendment to ensure that the flexibilities relating to access to medicine and health 
are incorporated into national legislation.‟
18
 
The above, while encouraging and seemingly quite specific, will require careful scrutiny by 
public health organisations and commentators to ensure that it is implemented in a way 
which does indeed prioritise public health interests and access to medicines, rather than 
commercial interests. To that end, it is important that the Government consult widely and 
take a holistic view of the „economic‟ implications of a patent framework review – to take 
into account the wider economic benefits of a healthy population, and not submit to narrow 
commercial pressures.  
The Government is also under an obligation stemming from recent announcements 
to implement TRIPS flexibilities under the auspices of the India-Brazil-South Africa 
(IBSA) Dialogue Forum. Meeting in October 2011, leaders of this group declared as 
follows:   
„The Leaders expressed their conviction that universal access to healthcare and 
affordable medicines is an indispensible step to achieve the ambitious goals 
adopted by the international community in the fight against communicable and non 
communicable diseases, as set forth by the Political Declaration on HIV and AIDS 
                                                             
17 As far as this author can determine. 
18 Letter from Minster for Trade and Industry, Rob Davies, reproduced in TAC‟s „Fix the Patent Laws: 
Campaigning for pro-public health reform of South Africa‟s Patents Act‟ briefing document, 26 January 2012 
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of 2011 and by the Political Declaration on the Prevention and Control of Non-
communicable diseases of 2011.  
Furthermore, the Leaders recognised that the effective impact of intellectual 
property on health, access to drugs and prices can best be tackled by enabling 
developing nations to scale up production of through the full use generic medicines 
of the flexibilities provided by the [TRIPS] agreement, in accordance with the Doha 
Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health, and, with the support of the World 




The IBSA Dialogue is a particularly relevant forum to be pursuing policy and legislative 
options for implementing TRIPS flexibilities, since India and Brazil, as will be discussed in 
this dissertation, have both implemented TRIPS flexibilities in various ways which can 
provide guidance for South Africa. It is hoped that this relationship, through advice and 
close cooperation, will be capitalised upon by South Africa, as it considers these important 
access to medicines IP policy review issues.   
One final sign of the Government‟s commitment to pursue patent amendments in 
the near future can be found in the DTI‟s Medium-Term Strategic Framework (2010-2013), 
in which it commits itself to „ensuring consumer protection‟ by, inter alia, 




It is important to spend a large section of this dissertation canvassing public 
Government commitments to implement the TRIPS Agreement, because clear and detailed 
intentions have not yet been revealed. While the above is encouraging, there is growing 
concern among some sectors that, despite South Africa‟s history of activism in driving the 
early access to medicines movement, and despite the massive public health challenges the 
country continues to face, there is a growing trend for conservative (read: prioritisation of 
business over public interests) IP policy among government officials. This has created a 
                                                             
19 Paras 57-58, IBSA Dialogue Forum Fifth Summit of Heads of State and Government, Tshwane 
Declaration, 18 October 2011. 
20
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sense of unease as to whether such amendments and future policies will be made which 
prioritises public health.   
For example, there will be a conference in Cape Town in April 2012 entitled, 
„Africa Intellectual Property Forum: Intellectual Property, Regional Integration and 
Economic Growth in Africa‟. This ministerial level meeting will bring together the 
governments of the France, Japan, South Africa, and the United States, WIPO, and in 
collaboration with the African Intellectual Property Organization (OAPI), the African 
Regional Intellectual Property Organization (ARIPO), and the international private 
sector.
21
 It is reported to address the „dynamic role of intellectual property protection and 
enforcement in promoting knowledge-based economies through innovation, trade and 
investment.‟
22
 It is sponsored by an anti-piracy business coalition, Microsoft and two brand 
name pharmaceutical companies.  
This is the first conference of its kind, so it will remain to be seen how this meeting 
might impact, if at all, on policy making in South Africa. However the sessions are set to 
cover issues like regional integration on IP, fostering innovation through IP, protection and 
enforcement, and administration and management of IP. Notably absent from the agenda is 
any discussion of the relationship between public health and IP (except in the 
counterfeiting arena), or the WIPO development agenda or any other developing country 
issues. The skewed agenda has not escaped the attention of public health commentators, 
who have lamented the focus on IP strengthening and enforcement, without any concurrent 
attention to stimulating innovation in developing countries.
23
  
Also of concern is the significant pharmaceutical company sponsorship, and notable 
lack of the presence of any public health or other non-government, not for profit entities. 
Lack of input from civil society similarly was evident in the recently agreed Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), a trade agreement signed by ten mostly 
                                                             
21 US Department of Commerce website, „Africa Intellectual Property Forum: Intellectual Property, Regional 
Integration and Economic Growth in Africa‟ website http://www.cldp.doc.gov/programs/Africa-intellectual-
property-forum [Accessed 2 February 2012]. 
22 Ibid. 
23 See Davidson, B, „Africa should be wary of US propaganda on intellectual property‟, Open Society 
Foundations blog, 3 February 2012, and Balasubramaniam, T, „US, France, Japan, South Africa, WIPO, ICC-
BASCAP, Lilly, Microsoft and Pfizer co-sponsor Africa IP Forum in Cape Town‟, KEI blog, 1 February 
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developed countries, plus the EU, and is aimed at „effectively combating global 
proliferation of commercial-scale counterfeiting and piracy.‟
24
 Throughout negotiations for 
ACTA, the negotiating countries came under significant, but largely unheeded, criticism 
for consulting closely with industry while providing bare-minimum access for public 
interest organisations.
25
   
One final structural concern is that this forum brings together (exclusively) the 
governments of South Africa plus three countries which are home to significant originator 
pharmaceutical industries, and which have been active in pushing for stronger IP protection 
and enforcement on the international stage. This is just one conference, and it would be 
unfair to assume the government may be so impressionable to lead it to direct substantive 
future policy. But this skewed influence in policy forums is illustrative of a wider, 
concerning focus away from how IP can be used to help public health, towards a more 
insistently business-centric IP protection framework.  
In developing legislation and policy around implementation of TRIPS flexibilities, 
it is important that the South African Government depart from such a non-transparent and 
non-inclusive tendency which, unfortunately, is becoming more common in intellectual 
property policy-making processes.  
Collectively, the commitments by Government mentioned in this section to use to 
IP flexibilities which will work for public health need to be recalled – for the positive 
obligation they place on th  Government to live up to what it has promised. That is, to 
implement TRIPS flexibilities by amending the Patents Act in a way this is not only 
inclusive of, but prioritises public health objectives.  The Government is not only bound to 
live up to its political promises, but it is also constitutionally obliged to fulfil an imperative 
to progressively realise the human right to health.  
Human rights law imperative to amend the Patents Act  
In putting forward the positive legal, social and economic implications to be 
achieved through full implementation of TRIPS flexibilities, it is helpful to take a human 
                                                             
24 ACTA, signed on 1 October 2011, see http://www.ustr.gov/acta for more detail.  
25 See, for example, letter from KEI (Knowledge Ecology International) and others, „Petition to President 
Obama regarding transparency of the Anticounterfeiting Trade Agreement‟ http://keionline.org/acta-petition 
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rights approach. Inserting human rights into the case highlights that not only are the 
changes a good idea for the health and wellbeing of the people of the Republic, but reminds 
us that the Governments is in fact under an obligation to make such changes, by virtue of 
the human rights instruments to which it is subscribed. The human right to health, along 
with the associated obligations on Government to take steps to progressively realise it, is 
codified in international agreements, to which South Africa is party, as well as in national 
legislation.  
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that „Everyone has the right to a 
standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, 
including…medical care‟.
26
 The International Covenant on Economic, Cultural and Social 
Rights (ICESCR) elaborates on this right, recognising „the right of everyone to the 
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health‟ and placing an 
obligation on states to take steps to „achieve the full realisation of this right‟.
27
 As a 
signatory to the ICESCR, South Africa has committed to „take steps, individually and 
through international assistance and co-operation…to the maximum of its available 
resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights 
recognized in the present Covenant.‟
28
 
Identifying that an assessment of „progressive realisation‟ of ICSECR rights may 
attract very different points of view, and determining the exact extent of states obligations 
difficult, the Committee on Economic, Cultural and Social Rights has provided the 
following guidance:  
„the fact that realization over time, or in other words progressively, is foreseen 
under the Covenant should not be misinterpreted as depriving the obligation of all 
meaningful content. It is on the one hand a necessary flexibility device, reflecting 
the realities of the real world and the difficulties involved for any country in 
ensuring full realization of economic, social and cultural rights. On the other hand, 
the phrase must be read in the light of the overall objective, indeed the raison 
d'être, of the Covenant which is to establish clear obligations for States parties in 
                                                             
26 Article 27(1) United Nations, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). 
27 Article 12 ICESCR (1976). 
28
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respect of the full realization of the rights in question. It thus imposes an obligation 
to move as expeditiously and effectively as possible towards that goal.‟
29
 
Specific to the right to health, that Committee has also clarified that provision of essential 
medicines, as defined by the WHO Action Programme on Essential Drugs, forms part of 
this obligation,
30
 and that the duties of States includes the duty to, inter alia, „to adopt 
legislation or to take other measures ensuring equal access to health care and health-related 
services provided by third parties; [and] to ensure that privatization of the health sector 
does not constitute a threat to the availability, accessibility, acceptability and quality of 
health facilities, goods and services.‟
31
 Given that in practice, availability depends on 
affordability, which in turn depends on whether the price is within the reach of users,
32
 this 
author would argue that South Africa is under a clear obligation to adopt measures to make 
medicines more affordable, and thus accessible. Part of such a strategy must include 
making the Patents Act changes to make full use of the TRIPS flexibilities.  
The South African Constitution also codifies the right of everyone to have access to 
healthcare.
33
  Like the relevant international law, the South African Constitution places a 
positive obligation on the Government to take legislative and other measures, within its 
available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of that right to healthcare.
34
 The 
right to health, and the extent of obligation on the Government to take steps to realise it, 
was a central tenet of the battles to secure affordable access to some generic ARTs in South 
Africa in the late 1990s and 2000s. The successful use of human rights by TAC in those 
battles, Mark Heywood has argued, lay in imparting among the poor and affected, „not just 
an understanding of how to mouth human rights, but also how to apply them as demands in 
relation to specific social issues.‟
35
  
                                                             
29 Paragraph 9, UN Committee on Economic, Cultural and Social Rights, „Substantive issues arising in the 
implementation of the ICESCR: The nature of States parties obligations (Art. 2, par.1)‟, General Comment 
No. 3 (1990). 
30 Article 43(d) UN Committee on ECSR, „Substantive issues arising in the implementation of the ICESCR: 
the highest attainable standard of health (article 12)‟, General Comment No. 14 (2000) 
31 Paragraph 35, ibid. 
32 Klopper H et al, „Law of Intellectual Property in South Africa‟ LexisNexis Group, 2010, p 442-443. 
33 Section 27(1)(b) Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, No 108 of 1996. 
34 Section 27(3) Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, No 108 of 1996. 
35 Heywood, M, „South Africa´s Treatment Action Campaign (TAC): An example of a successful human 
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The human right to health should remain paramount for the South African 
government as it now is urged to consider the next wave of action to achieve the right to 
health, by enhancing access to medicines through the Patents Act proposed amendments. 
But to keep human rights front and centre of debates and consultations around the 
amendments would not be a uniquely South African fixation – the human right to health is 
also extensively codified in national instruments in a number of countries, with health 
rights now appearing in over two thirds of constitutions worldwide.
36
 For the South African 
Government to take these proposed amendments forward on the grounds that they support 
progressive realisation of the right to health, therefore, would not be to stand on a distant 
limb by itself.  
 
 
                                                             
36 Forman, L “Health „rights" and wrongs: what utility for the right to health in reforming trade rules on 
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Chapter 2: Introduce stricter criteria for granting patentability 
This chapter argues that the grounds for patentability are too broad in South Africa, 
and that amendments to the Patents Act should be made to ensure that only those medicines 
which are truly innovative receive patent protection. Not only must the legal criteria be 
tightened around patentability, but these criteria should be more closely scrutinised against 
each application so that frivolous applications – those which do not meet these stricter 
standards of patentability – are not successful.  
South Africa should take advantage of the degree of flexibility contained in TRIPS 
for Members to determine appropriate standards for granting a patent. This chapter firstly 
describes the process of pharmaceutical patent evergreening, arguing the public health 
imperatives to avoid it, and demonstrating, through a number of examples, how it is 
damaging both to both to the level of access to existing drugs, as well as to the incentive to 
make real innovations for healthcare. The chapter then outlines the current criteria for 
patentability in South Africa, and makes suggestions as to how patentability of medical 
inventions under the Patents Act (and national policy) should be tightened.  
The specific proposals for establishing stricter grounds for patentability in South 
Africa focus on excluding or limiting from patentability „new use‟ and limiting „new form‟ 
patents. The term „new use‟ applies to patents which are filed at a later date than the 
original patent, when new uses for an existing invention are subsequently discovered. In 
the pharmaceutical sector, new use patents may apply to applications on new formulations 
or delivery methods of a drug, new and improved manufacturing processes, reduced dosage 
regimens, new versions of the active compound or other variations that meet the 
patentability requirements.
37
 „New form‟ patents can be found when new patents are 
granted on known substances – in the pharmaceuticals arena, this might mean slightly 
tweaking the form of a known active ingredient, for example, by encasing in alternative 
preservatives, or changing the mode of delivery. 
Rewarding incremental innovation with new use and new form patents is not an 
unusual international practice – many countries have chosen to allow it. But it is not 
                                                             
37WIPO, „Intellectual Property Rights for SMEs in the Pharmaceutical Industry‟ 
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required under TRIPS and should not be considered best practice, for the reasons outlined 
below. Many countries also provide alternative frameworks for innovations which do not 
meet patentability criteria, but which are considered worthy of protection nonetheless. 
These protections for minor innovations are often granted protection for a shorter period, 
and called „innovation patents‟ in Australia, „petty patents‟ in Thailand and Indonesia, „new 
utility models‟ in Taiwan, and „utility solutions‟ in Vietnam,
38
 – they all provide alternative 
models where full patent protection is considered inappropriate because of an insufficient 
level of innovation. Similar alternative models in South Africa may also be worth further 
study.  
What is ‘evergreening’? How can amending the criteria for patentability work to 
prevent it? 
A patent is granted for twenty years from the date of application in most countries, 
including South Africa
39
, but drug manufacturers will often try to extend the effective life 
of their monopoly by gaining additional patents on very similar products. This activity, 
described as evergreening, and sometimes called „me too‟ patenting, has been defined as a 
„strategy consisting of acquiring patents on minor, often trivial, modifications of existing 
pharmaceutical products or processes in rder to indirectly extend the period of patent 
protection over previously patented compounds”.
40
 Evergreening is detrimental to public 
health because it means that patented products remain unaffordable for longer periods of 
time, and is particularly detrimental for access to medicines which are not eligible, or for 
which there is little political impetus for, a compulsory licence.  
Within the drug development, approval and registration process, the technical terms 
for those new drugs which have gone down the most rigorous and lengthy approval 
process, are new chemical entities (NCEs) and new molecular entities (NMEs). It is 
important to differentiate between NCEs/NMEs and those which are „new‟ in the sense that 
they have become newly available, but which are merely combinations of existing drugs, or 
new uses of known compounds. Despite the fact that NCEs/NMEs are often treated the 
same by drug companies promoting their product, and subsequently by the popular press, 
                                                             
38 Suthersanen U, et al, „Innovation without patents‟, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, UK (2007), p iv.  
39 Section 46(1) Patents Act, No 57 of 1978 (as last amended by Act no 49 of 1996). 
40
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these drugs have undergone very different development processes and reflect a different 
level of innovation, and as such, should receive different levels of protection.
41
  
An example of evergreening can be found in the evolution of use of the popular 
heartburn drug emeprazole (marketed as Prilosec) and the follow-on drug, esomeprazole 
(marketed as Nexium). There is significant evidence that Prilosec and Nexium have very 
similar characteristics in chemistry and mechanism, apart from a minor difference in the 
salt encasing of the two drugs.
42
 In the lead up to the patent expiry of Prilosec in 2001 
however, the patent holder, AstraZeneca began a concerted public affairs, marketing and 
patenting campaign to shift users to the follow-on, Nexium, despite the near-identical 
characteristics of the two drugs. 
In order to support this campaign, AstraZeneca undertook a multifaceted strategy. 
On the marketing and regulatory side, the company relied on a study which found that 
Nexium worked slightly better for a single, uncommon condition called esophagitis, in 
order to garner support for  Nexium as a new and improved version; the next generation 
„Purple Pill‟.
43
 The company also relied on a patenting, where they strategically employed 
minor, but potentially significant changes to already patented compounds, by seeking 
patents on inactive compounds (which bl ck use and market access by others), and by 
listing patents on the register specifically to deter or initiate litigation.
44
 One study 
identified 82 patents granted over 20 years associated with the two compounds, giving a 50 
year cumulative term of patent protection.
45
  
The excesses of this example play out with the highest impact in the United States, 
where direct-to-consumer advertising is permitted. However, negative effects because of 
the patenting strategies and litigation have also been felt in other countries.
46
 If higher 
                                                             
41 Ho, C „Access to medicines in the global economy: International agreements on patents and related rights‟, 
Oxford University Press, 2011, p 7. 
42 See, for example Bouchard, R et al, „The Pas de Deux of pharmaceutical regulation and innovation: Who‟s 
leading whom?‟ Berkeley Technology Law Journal Vol 24.3 (2009), p 1504, and Ho, C, ibid, p 7.  
43 Washington, H, „Deadly Monopolies‟, Doubleday publishing, United States, 2011, p 1503.   
44 Bouchard, R et al, op cit p 1504. 
45 ibid. 
46 E.g., Canada also experienced significant litigation over the two drugs (Source: Bouchard, R et al, in op cit, 
as did Indian company, Ranbaxy, when it attempted to launch generic versions (Source: Astra Zeneca 
„AstraZeneca Settles US Nexium Patent Litigation with Ranbaxy‟ Media release, 15 April 2008, 
http://www.astrazeneca.com/Media/Press-releases/Article/20080415--AstraZeneca-Settles-US-Nexium-
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standards of novelty, inventiveness and industrial application were required by law in 
South Africa (and assessment at time of application for patent is made against these 
criteria), it is possible that this sort of situation, where patents can be litigated on highly 
similar drugs to extend the effective life of that particular drug, or drugs like it, can be 
avoided (or at least limited – as we will see the Indian legislation, which does reject new 
use patents, has still attracted litigious behaviour from pharmaceutical companies).  
A more recent, and even more extreme, example of attempted evergreening can be 
found, again in the United States, in the recent litigation by Warner Chilcott to prevent 
attempts by Mylan Pharmaceuticals to launch a generic version of the acne antibiotic 
product, DORYX 150mg, which Warner Chilcott produces on exclusive license from the 
patent holder.
47
 The Warner Chilcott-produced Doryx tablet previously had one score 
across the tablet, and generic firms were planning to introduce a generic of this version in 
late 2011. According to reports, however, around that same time Warner Chilcott added a 
second score to its tablet, and two days later filed a citizen‟s petition asking the Food and 
Drug Administration to reject any generics that lacked the new design.
48
  
While the final outcome of this dispute is yet to be determined (at the time of 
printing, proceedings are ongoing and have reportedly been remanded to the New Jersey 
District Court to fulfil requirements of evidentiary hearing
49
), this example highlights an 
alarming trend of frivolous patenting becoming increasingly apparent in the United States, 
where the threshold for novelty and inventiveness are not high.    
Of course there are many factors which have contributed to the success of 
evergreening practices such as those described above, to extend the effective life of patent 
monopolies, and which consequently contribute to unaffordable drug prices. In the medical 
technology field, these include regulations around direct-to-consumer advertising, quality 
of peer-review, as well as industry-doctor financial relations, all of which also have 
                                                             
47 See Rockoff, J, „Drug maker's ploy to delay generics: Add a line to pill‟, Wall Street Journal, 7 October 
2011 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204294504576615273524482778.html?mod=rss_Health#art
icleTabs%3Darticle [Accessed 4 January 2012]. 
48 Silverman, E „How to delay generics? Draw a line on a pill‟ Pharmalot, 7 October 2011 
http://www.pharmalot.com/2011/10/how-to-delay-generics-draw-a-line-on-a-pill/  
49 Anonymous, Wall Street Journal „Warner Chilcott Announces Decision on Appeal of DORYX Preliminary 
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important effects on the ongoing prices of particular medicines, but which are beyond the 
scope of this dissertation. The interesting point for current purposes however, is to explore 
the extent to which South Africa may, under international law, and should, according to 
public interest, limit those circumstances, so that only those medicines which are truly 
innovative receive a patent in the first place. The main ways to limit those circumstances 
are to exclude new use and new form patents. These proposed measures are discussed 
below. 
Standards of patentability under the TRIPS Agreement  
The TRIPS Agreement specifies that patents must be available in Member countries 
„for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided 
that they are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial application.‟
50
 For 
the purposes of that requirement, the TRIPS Agreement clarifies that „inventive step‟ may 
be deemed by a Member as synonymous with the terms „non-obvious‟. And „capable of 
industrial application‟ may be deemed synonymous with „useful‟.
51
  
While the above establishes a prima facie obligation to make available patent 
protection across all fields of technology, the Agreement does not, however, go on to 
define further the concepts of novelty, inventiveness, and industrial applicability, thus 
granting a degree of flexibility for countries to determine how these criterion should be 
interpreted and applied.
52
 One seminal commentary on this requirement observes that all 
countries thus have ample scope to determine how strictly the common standards of TRIPS 
would be applied, as well as where the burden of demonstrating novelty out to lie.
53
 
Countries therefore, are only subject to the rules of interpretation under the Vienna Treaty, 
and in line with this flexibility, have thus adopted a wide variety of national approaches to 
address how these characteristics are defined and applied.
54
 
                                                             
50 Article 27(1) TRIPS.  
51 Footnote to Article 27(1) TRIPS. 
52 Musungu, S and Oh, C, „The use of flexibilities in TRIPS by developing countries: can they promote access 
to medicines?‟Study 4C, Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation and Public Health, WHO 
(2005); p 34.  
53 Commission on Intellectual Property Rights (UK Government) „Patent reform‟ Integrating Intellectual 
Property Rights and Development Policy http://www.iprcommission.org/papers/pdfs/final_report/ch6final.pdf 
[Accessed 4 January 2012]. 
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How to tighten standards of patentability – strengthening the definitions of ‘novelty, 
inventiveness and industrial application’ in South African law 
The South African Companies and Intellectual Property Commission (CIPC)
 55
, 
(which, since May 2011, incorporates the previous functions of the former Companies and 
Intellectual Property Registration Office, CIPRO), has a non-examining role when it 
considers patent applications. That is to say that the CIPC does not examine the merits of 
each application to determine whether it represents a sufficient degree of novelty, 
inventiveness and industrial application before granting the patent. Some commentators 
thus, refer to the South African patents office as merely a „registration office‟, where 
applications are examined only for formalities, and not for substance.
56
 
While the Patents Act does not specifically provide for new use patents, it does not 
specifically forbid it either. The Act specifies that a patent may be granted for „any new 
invention which involves an inventive step and which is capable of being used in trade or 
in agriculture.‟
57
 The Act goes on to specify just two circumstances where a patent will not 
be granted: where the publication or expected to encourage offensive or immoral 
behaviour, or for any variety of animal or plant or any other essentially biological process 
for the production of animals or plants, n t being micro-biological process. 
58
 
These relatively broad set of circumstances under which a patent may be granted 
has led to a situation where a new use application, or an application for a tweaked 
invention, will generally b  successful unless someone opposes it. Pre- and post-grant 
opposition to patents is provided for under current South African law (albeit under 
effectively limited circumstances, and suggestions for amending this opposition 
requirements are provided in the next chapter). This chapter deals rather with how to 
improve the application process, requiring a critical examination of the claims, so that 
spurious or exaggerated patents are not granted or considered in the first place.  
                                                             
55 See CIPC website http://www.cipro.co.za/ [Accessed 4 January 2011].  
56 Klopper H et al, op cit, p 297. 
57 Section 25(1) Patents Act. 
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Excluding ‘new form’ and ‘new use’?  
Under TRIPS it is possible to argue that the South African Government is free to 
exclude from patentability altogether new uses on known, patented pharmaceutical 
substances. As explained above, TRIPS leaves a certain level of flexibility for countries to 
determine for themselves the appropriate definitions of novelty, inventiveness, and 
industrial applicability. But in addition to that flexibility, TRIPS also explicitly allows 
countries to exclude from patentability „diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for 
the treatment of humans or animals‟,
59
 and it has been argued that new uses on known 
substances can also be excluded under this permissible exception, because new uses are 
essentially equivalent to therapeutic methods.
60
   
The Andean community is one example of complete exclusion from patentability 
„[p]roducts or processes already patented and included in the state of the art... may not be 
the subject of new patents on the sole ground of having been put to a use different from that 
originally contemplated by the initial patent.‟
61
While it is theoretically possible for a new 
use patent under this provision, i.e., if accompanied by innovations other than new use, 
such a provision simply establishes that new use alone will not be enough to establish 
patentability. Egypt also excludes from patentability second medical use patents.
62
 Even if 
frivolous patents are then also theoretically possible under such provisions (new 
formulations do not appear to be excluded under the regime), one might expect that it 
might at least discourages such applications.  
Moreover, there may be reason why the South African Government might not chose 
to exclude altogether new use or new form patents in such a way as the Andean 
Community countries have, as above. It has been pointed out by some that the benefits of 
excluding new use patents altogether may be greatest for developing countries with little to 
no research and development capacity.
63
 This might be because incremental innovation 
sometimes has an important role to play – for example, the development of a heat stable 
                                                             
59 Article 27 (3)(a) TRIPS. 
60 IPR Commission, „Patent reform‟, Integrating Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy, UK 
Government, p 49.  
61 Article 27, Common Intellectual Property Regime, Andean Community 
62 Thorpe, P „Study paper 7: study on the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement by developing countries‟ 
Commission on Intellectual Property Rights (UK), p 19.  
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version of an existing drug years after the original drug was patented would likely yield 
benefit for patients in many parts of South Africa.  
Objections might be raised for fear of negative implications for investment and 
research incentives if any kind of new use or new form patent were excluded altogether, 
since South Africa does, in fact, have a certain level of research capacity. The Government 
may be wary of avoiding negative pressures to FDI, although should not overestimate the 
effect it would have on incentives in this developing country market.
64
 Working within the 
existing „virtuous cycle‟ model of encouraging innovation, by rewarding investment in 
innovation with patent protection, it may be that the South Africa Government should 
chose to rather to more closely control the level of novelty, inventiveness and industrial 
applicability for new use and new form patents.   
Limiting ‘new use’ and ‘new form’ 
Providing exceptions to the blanket acceptability of new use and new formulation 
patents, rather than outright excluding, would still represent an improvement upon current 
arrangements, but likely represent a more politically palatable amendment. India‟s 
experience in determining for itself the appropriate criteria for patentability presents an 
excellent starting point for South Africa in developing its own model to tighten 
patentability, where patents for new uses or formulations are only granted if an applicant 
can demonstrate increased therapeutic effectiveness over existing uses or formulations. 
This model has not, however, operated without controversy, and the provisions have been 
subject to sustained litigation over time. The final outcome is yet to be determined, but the 
story is worth expanding on below.  
India’s example 
India has been dubbed the „pharmacy of the developing world,‟ for its role in 
manufacturing and exporting generic medicines, which have often been on patent 
elsewhere. Indian-produced generic ARVs accounted for over 80 per cent of the donor-
                                                             
64 This author recognises that levels of private, non-philanthropic investment in R&D to develop technologies 
for those illnesses which do not have a large potential markets will likely not, in any case, be affected by 
whether patent protection is available or not for follow-on products. How to de-link the costs of research and 
development from patent protection is an important question, but beyond the scope of this dissertation. The 
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funded purchases of ARVs between 2006-2008.
65
 However this situation is under threat – 
India has had to comply with more stringent intellectual property measures since 2005, 




Among other things, TRIPS implementation has meant that India has had to begin 
granting patents for pharmaceutical products (not just processes) for the first time.
67
 The 
concerns and implications of this development in Indian patent law on access to newer 
medicines in developing countries are great, but beyond the scope of this dissertation. What 
is relevant for this section, is the public health safeguard that India has implemented 
alongside its enhanced intellectual property protections. In implementing TRIPS compliant 
provisions, India has developed additional provisions which narrow (by many international 
standards) the circumstances under which patents in general may be granted. As mentioned 
above, because TRIPS does not specify the terms for patentability, this move is completely 
legitimate with international law.  
India has introduced tighter standards for granting new use and new form 
pharmaceutical patents, and its experience can lend lessons to what might be envisaged 
under such changes to South African law. The 1970 Indian Patents Act sets out a number 
of inventions which are not patentable, including, inter alia, any invention which is 
frivolous or which claims anything obvious contrary to well established natural laws; 
inventions whose primary use would be contrary to law or morality or injurious to public 
health; mere discovery of scientific principle or the formulation of an abstract theory; and 
certain medicinal or surgical processes and treatments.
68
  
In developing implementing legislation to comply with TRIPS provisions, an 
amendment was made this text on of non-patentable inventions, replacing wording of one 
invention which would not fall within the meaning of the Act, as follows: 
                                                             
65 Waning, B, Diedrichsen, E and Moon, S,‟ A lifeline to treatment: the role of Indian generic 
manufacturers in supplying antiretroviral medicines to developing countries‟, Journal of the International 
AIDS Society (2010) 13:35, p 3.   
66 WTO, „Pharmaceutical patents and the TRIPS Agreement‟ 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/pharma_ato186_e.htm [Accessed 30 December 2011]. 
67 Ibid. 
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„the mere discovery of a new form of a known substance which does not result in 
the enhancement of the known efficacy of that substance or the mere discovery of 
any new property or new use for a known substance or of the mere use of a known 
process, machine or apparatus unless such known process results in a new product 
or employs at least one new reactant.‟
69
 
An explanatory note to this provision was further inserted, providing that  
„for the purposes of this clause, salts, esters, ethers, polymorphs, metabolites, pure 
form, particle size, isomers, mixtures of isomers, complexes, combinations and 
other derivatives of known substance shall be considered to be the same substance, 
unless they differ significantly in properties with regard to efficacy.‟
70
 
This section effectively rules out patentability of many of the kinds of „me-too‟ patents 
which are claimed on flow on inventions from other medicines, which are experienced in 
other parts of the world. While Section 3(d) has attracted much interest and controversy for 
its compliance with TRIPS, the provision doesn‟t necessarily place stricter requirements 
than are used elsewhere; but it simply shifts the burden on to the applicant to prove that 




The most controversial test of Section 3(d) has played out in ongoing litigation in 
Chennai, regarding the patentability of Novartis‟s drug for Chronic Myeloid Leukemia, 
Gleevec/Glevic. Novartis filed its first patent on Glevic in the United States in 1992, before 
India granted patent protections on pharmaceutical products. In 1997, Novartis started to 
apply for patents for a second version of that drug, the beta-crystalline version of imatinib 
mesylate. At that time, the application for the chrystalline version (the „follow-on‟) drug 
was received in India under „mailbox‟ provisions, whereby India had agreed to receive 
patent applications to be reviewed in 2005, when it was to become TRIPS compliant.
72
 But 
in January 2006, Novartis‟s application for a patent on Glivec was rejected, on the grounds 
                                                             
69 Amendment of Section 3(d) Patents (Amendment) Act, No 15 of 2005. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Mueller, J, „Taking TRIPS to India – Novartis, Patent Law, and Access to Medicines‟, New England 
Journal of Medicine, (2007) 356:541-543. 
72 Eks, S „Global pharmaceutical markets and corporate citizenship: The case of Novartis' anti-cancer drug 
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that a patent had already been granted for the active molecule, imnatib, and the follow-on 
was merely a new form of an old drug, and therefore not patentable under Indian law.
73
 
In June 2006, Novartis issued a series of writ petitions (later converted to statutory 
appeals) against the Government of India‟s decision not to grant the follow-on patent, as 
well as against the validity of Section 3(d), arguing that it was it was incompatible with 
TRIPS, and the meaning of „efficacy‟ in terms of the Act‟s  requirement that that an 
applicant demonstrate „increased efficacy‟ in order to receive a patent for any follow-on 
products.
74
 Also, that the provision was vague and ambiguous, and therefore violated the 
Article 14 „right to equality before the law‟ provision of the Indian Constitution.
75
  
The High Court refused to consider the question of TRIPS compatibility, on the 
grounds that such a challenge to the manner of implementation of its TRIPS obligations 
should go to the WTO Dispute Settlement Body only.
76
 While the US Government has 
alluded to potential conflicts of the Section 3(d) provisions with the TRIPS agreement,
77
 no 
formal proceedings have ever been brought before WTO dispute settlement bodies.  
More interestingly, responding to Novartis‟s challenge of the Section 3(d) 
requirement that an applicant demonstrate „increased efficacy‟ in order to receive a patent 
for any follow-on products, the Court held that the provision did not, as claimed by 
Novartis, suffer from the vice of vagueness, ambiguity and arbitrariness.
78
 This was a 
erroneous claim, the Justices said, because efficacy meant therapeutic efficacy in the 
pharmaceutical field; wher  such efficacy is assessed by patent controllers who are experts 
in the pharmaceutical field, and whether the efficacy of a substance could be deemed 
„enhanced‟ could also be clinically found by those in the field.
79
  
This ruling is important for any South African plans to introduce similar legislation, 
as the reasoning that „therapeutic efficacy‟ was not, in fact, vague, depends on the presence 
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of pharmaceutical experts assessing pharmaceutical patent applications. It is also relevant 
to note that in South Africa, where Gleevec is only available in the private sector, this 
particular drug costs ten times that of its generic Indian equivalent.
80
  
The introduction of tighter standards of patentability then, by inserting requirements 
for follow on would-be patentees to demonstrate improved „therapeutic efficacy‟ (or 
something similar) in South Africa, should be coupled with some form of assessment by 
pharmaceutical experts. In the eventuality of such legislation in South Africa, and any 
subsequent challenges by the pharmaceutical industry or others, it is would be likely that 
this Indian ruling would be referred to. Specifically, it is possible that claims might be 
made that, without expert assessment of pharmaceutical patent applications, any 
assessment against substantial improvement of therapeutic efficacy would be invalid.  
The above ruling was appealed and heard by a bench of the Intellectual Property 
Appellate Board during September 2012, who held that while Novartis did satisfy the 
requirements of novelty and inventive step, they did not provide data to show that the beta-
crystalline form the drug exhibited significantly enhanced therapeutic efficacy over the 
known substance (imatinib mesylate), and therefore did not satisfy the section 3(d) test.
81
  
Novartis is now asking the Supreme Court to define of “efficacy” in a way that 
would include increases in bioavailabiliy (absorbability of a given drug by the body), rather 
than the more stringent definition of „therapeutic effect in healing a disease‟, which was 
applied by the Madras High Court.
82
  
For a South African model, it may not be advisable to expand further on the 
definition of therapeutic efficacy, lest it be claimed that such a list of circumstances which 
might meet the definition be considered conclusive. Rather, a way to avoid attracting such 
litigation on the definition may be for the South African legislation to include reference to 
an administrative process to determine advancements in therapeutic efficiency, in the event 
of a dispute or appeal from the patents application process. This proposal would of course 
need to be supported by budgetary increases, in order to attract appropriate expert advice, 
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but need not amount to extensive, permanent and costly structures. It could, for example, 
comprise simply of a list of experts which might intermittently be called upon, only in 
cases where the determination of the patent examiners is not straightforward.  
Regardless of the final outcome of this litigation in India, the case should result in 
some important judicial analysis on the meaning of Article 3(d), as well as other untested 
patent rules.
83
  The South African Government should therefore pay close notice to the how 
this case proceeds and the final outcome, to attempt to draft around apparent pitfalls, as 
they have emerged throughout the case, and particularly as they become evident in the final 
ruling.  
Brazil’s example – involving health ministry 
Brazil has also come up with an innovative way to raise the bar of patentability 
under its patent law, especially for follow-on pharmaceutical products, by introducing 
measures which require the involvement of health ministries in patent applications. South 
Africa ought to introduce similar provisions which either require or allow assessors to 
consult other qualified third parties, to make public health assessments on the desirability 
of granting a patent on a follow-on product.  
Brazil has had TRIPS compliant legislation since 1997, and introduced an 
amendment to its Lei de Proprieadade Industrial (LPI), coming into effect in 2001, which 
meant that any patent not be issued until the Ministry of  Health‟s „Health Surveillance 
Unit‟ issued its approval that the drug is patentable. This requirement, known as „prior 
consent‟ provisions, provides that „[t]he granting of patents on pharmaceutical products or 
processes shall depend on the prior consent of the National Sanitary Supervision Agency 
(ANVISA)‟,
84
 where ANVISA is a wing of the Ministry of Health.  
ANVISA has had a track record of generally rejecting applications for drug patents 
that lack „genuine‟ novelty and where it evaluates that providing exclusive rights would be 
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harmful to public health.
85
 ANVISA consequently tends to prevent patents that, by its 
judgment, would extend the terms of existing patents.
86
  
At the date of August 2008, of the applications sent to it for approval since 2001, 
68.9 percent of applications sent to ANVISA were approved (4.9 per cent rejected and 26.3 
percent were pending or other). Interestingly, of the 68.9 per cent approved, 42 per cent of 
these cases were first sent to the applicant to reduce the scope of the patent.
87
 
The „prior consent‟ requirement has, however, been plagued with controversy and 
opposition since its inception. ANVISA has come under sustained attacks for overstepping 
its ambit, with general claims that officials of the health portfolio are not suitably qualified 
or equipped to deal with the private and commercial issues of intellectual property. An 
important and specific criticism around the intent of the legislation, made by the national 
intellectual property organisation, was that the amendment was never meant to apply so 
broadly – that it was only ever intneded for it to apply to pipeline patents (those which 
preceded the enactment of the amendments).
88
 Under these complaints, ANVISA‟s 
functions have been subject to injunctions under legal challenges.  
The powers of ANVISA to grant its prior consent was again watered down in 2009, 
when the Attorney-General ruled that ANVISA may continue to make assessments of 
pharmaceuticals, but may only hold back its consent in cases where the granting of a patent 
would actually pose health risks (and thus no longer investigate novelty and inventiveness 
claims).
89
 Given that medicines which do not meet the human safety standards would not 
(one would hope and assume), meet the criteria of industrial applicability under current IP 
standards in Brazil,
90
 this ruling effectively rendered the provision ineffectual.  
Despite an outcry from public health groups, and formal petitioning to reverse the 
Attorney-General‟s position, the Solicitor-General of the new Brazilian Government 
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 confirming the effective withdrawal of the health department‟s 
power to intervene in the patent granting process on public health grounds. 
While the insertion of prior consent provisions in Brazilian law have been hailed by 
some for reinserting the public interest into patents at the time of their granting, time has 
shown that the idea behind the amendments clearly worked better than their 
implementation. South Africa is in the fortunate position of having the example of Brazil to 
learn from, if it is to consider similar requirements from its health department. Firstly, the 
legislation needs more detail than that provided by the short one-lined provision found in 
the Brazilian Industrial Property amendment. This would leave less room for 
(mis)interpretation on what grounds the health ministry may make its determinations, like 
that which made the Brazilian legislation so vulnerable.   
Furthermore, because this piece of legislation was made by executive decree, and 
not by the full legislative process, which would have included discussion and debate, it has 
been difficult for the judiciary to determine with conviction what the intent was
92
 – perhaps 
partly leading them to err on the side of caution with conservative estimates as to what was 
intended. When considering introducing similar legislation, South Africa should ensure that 
wide consultation is undertaken and full documentation of that process is recorded, in the 
aim of avoiding such controversy.  
Closer legislative attention to the processes for granting or withholding consent 
would also be advisable. As can be seen from the statistics above in Brazil, almost 70 
percent of applications had been approved by 2008, with less than 5 per cent outright 
rejected. This is not a terribly high rate of rejection. Almost half of the finally approved 
were sent of „back and forth‟ between ANVIZA and the applicants. The requirements to 
revise and resubmit have probably led to better quality patents. But this more flexible, 
„willingness to discuss‟ approach is not made clear in the legislation – the legislation 
appears to have provide for outright approval or rejection. For similar consent requirements 
in South Africa, clear guidelines on processes and expected timeframes, as part of any 
transparent and accountable administrative scheme, should be envisaged.  
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Resource considerations 
South Africa is a developing country, and with that, some may argue, comes 
resource constraints against closely examining the merits of every application coming 
before it. An argument might therefore be made for the carve-out of essential medical 
technologies then; applying the above stricter hurdles to proving inventiveness only for a 
class of technologies, deemed of most public health interest. This would achieve the public 
policy goals of achieving closer scrutiny for medical technologies, while at the same time 
not creating undue administrative burdens on the CIPC.  
However it should be recognised that singling out pharmaceuticals, as has done the 
Indian Section 3(d), may give rise to controversy about whether this discriminates against 
„a field of technology‟, which would be contrary to the non-discrimination provisions of 
TRIPS.
93
 If such a provision is envisaged under South African legislation then, particular 
reference must be made to the legal basis giving rise to the authority  to single out. Correa 
argues that the Doha Declaration might provide such legal basis, as it provides clear 
grounds that public health patents, in particular pharmaceutical patents, require special 
attention, if it is intended to protect public health.
94
  
Stricter patentability summarised 
The benefits of setting up a stricter framework for establishing patentability are 
twofold: firstly, South Africa escapes, at least to some extent, the effects of patent 
evergreening and is able to introduce generics much sooner, and secondly, innovators will 
be incentivised to pursue truly novel innovation, in the knowledge that second use and me-
too patent activity will not be supported and protected by the state.  
Not only would introducing these stricter grounds for patentability lead to better 
outcomes for South Africa, but it would contribute to a normative shift in the way we think 
about patentability internationally. With an ever-increasing pressure from other countries, 
particularly from those host to significant originator drug industries to lower the standards 
of patentability and introduce TRIPS pus measures (discussed in more detail in chapter 5), 
the value of any move by South Africa to tighten standards of patentability cannot be 
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overstated. To do so would expand the acceptability of such provisions and boost 
confidence for other countries to also reject frivolous patenting activities. As one patent 
activist in India has exclaimed, „If only South Africa would stand up and introduce stricter 
grounds for patentability, like India has done, I think the [Indian] Government would feel 
more confident in what it‟s doing around section 3d and patentability‟.
95
  
The benefits of requiring stricter patentability of any patentable product are realised 
as the perverse effects on incentives for making real innovation, are avoided. The case for 
requiring stricter standards of patentability in the pharmaceutical sector is all the stronger 
because of the immediate and opportunity costs associated with pharmaceutical patent 
evergreening. While care in drafting must be taken to avoid conflict with non-
discrimination requirements of TRIPS, the case can and should be made. Special carve outs 
have been made in other, arguably less life-threatening sectors. The US banking sector, for 
instance, has been able to carve out legislative provisions on „business methods and 
procedures‟ to protect themselves against frivolous patenting. These arguments are made 
on the basis that patents would impede their ability to do business (examples are automated 
methods of producing digital copies of cheques, or specialised financial and trading 
software).
96
 Making a similar case against frivolous patenting in the area of essential, 
potentially life-saving medicines, should be obvious.  
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Chapter 3: Introduce pre- and post- patent grant opposition  
Like Chapter 2, this chapter proposes measures aimed at preventing evergreening. 
Chapter 3 proposes that South African legislation be amended to introduce an 
administratively user-friendly way to oppose patents which do not meet the (proposed) 
higher standards of patentability. In South Africa currently, the Government may oppose 
patent applications and grants relatively easily, but it is much more difficult and expensive 
for third (non-government) parties to do so. At present, the only way for third parties to 
challenge a patent is through the courts, which is expensive and time-consuming for a great 
many organisations or individuals who may hold an interest in the success or not of a 
particular patent. 
Because of such obstacles, wrongly granted patents remain in place for the full 
duration of the patent, thus unduly creating a barrier to competition, with consumers 
ultimately prejudiced.
97
This section proposes the introduction of a transparent, 
administrative system for third parties to access easily and cheaply information about 
applications, and where third parties are provided with opportunity to make oppositions, 
within the context of a more rigorous patent examination system (as described in Chapter 
2).  
Introducing third party pre- and post-grant opposition to patent applications might 
be seen as a kind of safeguard where the patent assessment process falls short of spotting 
frivolous patenting, or patenting that falls short of satisfying novelty and inventive step. 
The process of calling for and accepting pre- and post-grant opposition essentially assists 
examiners, because competitors or other interested parties may be in a good position to 
recognise lack of inventive step or prior art.
98
 While opening up the examination process to 
competitors might at first glance appear to invite more litigation (as opposition is open to 
public health organisations as well as industry), it is important that these risks of improper 
use of an opposition system be considered in light of the opportunity costs incurred when 
protection is granted on undeserved inventions. It must be recalled also that competitors, 
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even if motivated for different reasons, are in a good position to bring new evidence to an 
examiner‟s attention, for example, precedents or evidence of prior art.
99
 
What TRIPS says about pre- and post-grant opposition 
In introducing pre- and post-grant opposition procedures, South Africa has a great 
deal of flexibility because TRIPS does not include any specific provisions on whether or 
how opposition to patents should be implemented, and no indications of an obligation not 
to allow it as a standard for every patent application. The only TRIPS restriction is that 
patent examinations are conducted „within a reasonable period of time so as to avoid 
unwarranted curtailment of the period of protection‟.
100
  
Proposed South African treatment of pre- and post-grant opposition 
In South Africa currently, a complete patent application becomes available for 
public inspection only when acceptance of the complete application is advertised.
101
 Until 
that time, particulars about the application (the scope of the patent, details of the patentee 
etc) remain confidential.
102
 Another party, thus, can only apply for revocation of the patent, 
without opening himself up to threat of an infringement claim, within a 9 month period 
after the date of the patent‟s grant.
103
 In this way then, the South African framework gives a 
9 month period for third parties to apply for revocation, but not adjustment.  
However it could be foreseen in many cases that grounds for opposition would fall 
on just one aspect of a patent claim, not the entire claim, with opponents therefore 
requesting adjustment on the scope or details, rather than complete annulation or 
revocation. If we envisage an opposition scheme in South Africa with both objectives in 
mind (revocation and adjustment), this could help lead to better quality patents and less 
cause for disputes and litigation down the line. Despite claims by some industry and 
countries that pre-grant opposition creates undue delays and uncertainties for patent 
applicants, others disagree. Public interest advocacy organisation, Public Citizen, for 
example, points out that pre- and post-grant opposition actually enhances certainty for both 
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generic and brand-name pharmaceutical companies, because contested patent claims are 
actually settled much earlier, and (by virtue of the administrative nature of opposition), 
more cheaply than post grant judicial proceedings could.
104
  
Encompassing either complete or partial objections then, the purpose for hearing 
objections is to allow third parties to put forward evidence to the patents office which may 
help it avoid making frivolous or poor quality patents.
105
 As a minimum, South African 
legislation might require the CIPC to either receive objections, or ideally, require the office 
to take them into consideration when making final determinations. 
Correa also points out that the success of an opposition scheme will depend on the 
capacity for pharmaceutical companies, health ministry officials, and public health 
organisations to monitor, identify and lodge oppositions.
106
 In South Africa, where a 
widespread culture of opposition does not currently exist then, training in interpretation of 
applications and a certain level of fluency around the patents process, will be required. In 
aspiring to build such a capacity, South Africa should call on developed countries in the 
WTO to fulfil their obligations to „provide, on request and on mutually agreed terms and 




India’s pre and post grant opposition framework  
Again, we look to India‟s pioneering example, where generous amounts of time and 
opportunities to voice a challenge have been incorporated into legislation around patent 
applications. Indian law allows „any person‟ to oppose a patent after publication but before 
granting on a wide range of grounds, but all based on the broad foundation that the 
invention is not patentable.
 108
 Further clauses provide for opposition for a period of up to 
one year after grant. After the expiry of one year, standard private law opposition will be 
the only option to oppose a patent.  This time limitation might prove restrictive in some 
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circumstances, where information legitimately does not come to light until a later date. 
However a limit on the available period is probably necessary for sustainability of the 
framework, and to afford some level of confidence to legitimate inventors. South Africa 
might consider, in implementing its own framework, similar time constrictions for 
opposition, but include a clause that „exceptional circumstances‟, such as fraud on the part 
of the applicant, for example, may justify opposition being launched outside of this 
timeframe.  
The grounds provided for opposition in India include a range of technical 
circumstances, including, amongst others, where the invention was published prior to 
application, and for administrative incompleteness. But more interestingly for current 
purposes, one ground for opposition lies where the invention „is obvious and clearly does 
not involve any inventive step‟.
109
The majority of cited grounds for launching an 
opposition in India fall where an application is allegedly incompliant with Section 3(d) – 
these oppositions have resulted in an 80 per cent success rate.
110
  
The fact that opposition is open to an „interested person‟ (in the case of post-grant), 
rather than „any person‟ (in the case of pre-grant opposition) might be an indication of 
intention for the provisions to apply to a narrower class of opponents in the case of post-
grant opposition. However it might be argued that such a distinction is insignificant, given 
that any applicant taking the time to oppose an application does, naturally, hold an interest 
in the outcome of the application. This author suggests that South African legislation not 
replicate this distinction, which is unnecessary but also could potentially attract litigation 
around the intentions underpinning the differences in drafting.  
In either event, these broad classes of potential opponents grant non-government 
actors, including public health organisations, the important opportunity to intervene where 
they believe that the granting of a patent might be detrimental to public health. Indeed, 
MSF has used pre-grant opposition provisions and the opportunity open to it as „any 
person‟ in a legal sense, to oppose HIV and follow-on cancer drug patents in India
111
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(MSF‟s ongoing opposition to patents on the follow-on chrystalline version of the cancer 
drug, Glivec, has been discussed in Chapter 2).  
India also has a „presumption of no validity‟ attached to granted patents, even after 
the one year opposition period after the grant has passed.
112
 This is a sensible approach, Oh 
has argued, given that most patents are granted without any opposition, and that even with 
patent examination (for substantial patentability, rather than just procedural correctness), 
the examination process cannot be considered exhaustive.
113
  
This chapter on pre- and post-grant opposition is not large, but has been included as 
a chapter in its own right because it is imperative that it is included as a key component of 
any TRIPS implementation package in South Africa. Without the transparency and 
accountability afforded by inexpensive and timely opportunities for interested parties to 
oppose patent applications, the safeguards for a framework which is geared towards wider 
societal public health interests, goes unchecked.  
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Chapter 4: Simplify and expand compulsory licensing 
The granting of compulsory licences on pharmaceutical patents is the TRIPS 
flexibility which has perhaps attracted the most attention in access to medicines debates. 
Compulsory licensing is when a government allows someone else to produce a patented 
product or process without the consent of the patent owner.
114
 At a first glance, this practise 
would seem like an ideal solution for a country like South Africa, which cannot afford a 
great chunk of the medicines it needs. Yet many governments, including South Africa, 
have been slow to take up the practice on any wide scale. Part of the reason for this is 
pressure from developed nations not to grant compulsory licenses. Other reasons are 
attributable to concerns about what effect such an acquisition of property by government 
might have on the country‟s ability to attract foreign direct investment (FDI). While the 
risks to FDI are overblown in many instances, South Africa, as a middle income country, 
can mitigate these risks by working collaboratively with other developing countries 
(particularly its neighbours). 
Locally, amendments should be made to the South African Patents Act to expand 
on current grounds to explicitly allow compulsory licences to be granted for public health 
imperatives in cases where prices are unaffordably expensive, and where there is a need for 
a novel fixed dose combination medicine comprising ingredients patented by multiple 
rights holders.
115
 Amendments should also include clear guidance as to process, details on 
evidentiary requirements, and guidance on what is a fair compensation to a patent holder. 
Clearer grounds for granting a compulsory license will deliver more certainty for all 
players – the Government, public health organisations, and industry (both brand name 
companies and generic manufacturers considering entering the market).  
Meanwhile internationally, South Africa should maintain pressure in the WTO to 
create user-friendly systems to import quality generics from other countries, as well as 
APIs to enable the development of a viable generics industry in South Africa.  
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Compulsory licensing under TRIPS 
This flexibility against absolute control of an inventor‟s intellectual property is 
established under Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement, which provides that a government, 
or third party authorised by the government, may use the subject matter of a patent without 
the authorisation of the right holder, where:  
„the proposed user has made efforts to obtain authorization from the right holder 
on reasonable commercial terms and conditions and that such efforts have not been 
successful within a reasonable period of time. This requirement may be waived by a 
Member in the case of a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme 
urgency or in cases of public non-commercial use.‟
116
 
The right of countries to issue compulsory licences by, or under the supervision of 
government, has thus existed since the beginning of TRIPS in 1994. However, amongst 
disagreement and confusion by many countries around the level of how a government 
would be entitled to invoke this flexibility, the Doha Declaration, in 2001 clarified that: 
„Each Member has the right to grant compulsory licences and the freedom to 
determine the grounds upon which such licences are granted.‟
117
 
At the same time as confirming the right of countries to determine for themselves 
appropriate grounds, the Declaration goes on to elaborate on the circumstances which 
might justify a compulsory license: 
„Each Member has the right to determine what constitutes a national emergency or 
other circumstances of extreme urgency, it being understood that public health 
crises, including those relating to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other 




The fact that the Doha Declaration specifically names some health issues under which a 
compulsory license might be granted, has mixed implications. On the one hand, it provides 
unequivocal grounds for South Africa to take compulsory licensing measures on the very 
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diseases which disproportionately affect it. On the other hand, it may have contributed to 
the reluctance to attempt compulsory licenses for health issues other than the big three: 
HIV, tuberculosis and malaria, even though „other epidemics‟ are technically provided for 
without negotiation. This needs to be written into national law.  
Compulsory licensing under South African law 
Compulsory licences are technically provided for under South African law, but 
none have ever been issued. In some instances, compulsory licences have been threatened, 
but the licences have rather been settled out of court, or in a result of pressure flowing from 
competition rulings, in the eventual form of a voluntary licence, under which the terms of 
the licence have been negotiated.  
Government use compulsory licences are relatively straightforward under South 
African legislation. The right of the government to intervene on patent rights for public 
purposes is established in Section 4 of the Patents Act „on such conditions as may be 
agreed upon with the patentee, or in default of agreement on such conditions as are 
determined by the commissioner on application by, or on behalf of such minister and after 
hearing the patentee.‟
119
    
The South African Government‟s power to issue compulsory licenses is also 
supported by Medicines and Related Substances Control Act. Following ongoing crisis in 
public health around the price of HIV medicines, in 1997 the South African Government 
initiated amendments to the Medicines and Related Substances Control Act, to empower 
the Minister for Health to „prescribe conditions for the supply of more affordable 
medicines in certain circumstances so as to protect the health of the public‟.
120
 The 
consequence of these Section 15C provisions is to empower the Minister to authorise the 
parallel importation and use of patented medicines, even in circumstances where such 
actions may conflict with the Patents Act.
121
 
The introduction of these amendments, in 1997, lead thirty nine pharmaceutical 
companies (under the PhRMA banner), along with the South African Pharmaceutical 
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Association, seeking injunctions in the High Court on several constitutional grounds 
(including for not setting out legislative and policy considerations in line with Section 43 
and 44; depriving or expropriating right holders of their IP rights under section 25 general 
property rights; and on the grounds that the provisions discriminated against 
pharmaceutical patents in contradiction with a number of constitutional provisions).
122
 
Following strong international pressure, however, the case did not proceed to trial, and 
South Africa began importing affordable ARVs from India.  
Although formerly untested through the courts, it might be assumed that the 
presence of these provisions, or the threat to invoke them, has lead to a sufficient level of 
pressure to force a number of successful voluntary license negotiations. But a particular 
consequence of a restricted framework for third parties accessing compulsory licences 
arises when the Government is either unwilling, unable, or under-resourced to be pursuing 
compulsory licences in the public interest. Since more extensive occurrence of government 
use compulsory licensing (threatened or actual) has not transpired, many commentators 
argue for a simplified, financially accessible system for third parties to apply for 
compulsory licenses.  
The TAC, for example,  would like to see the a more user-friendly system for 
granting CLs in South Africa, through the introduction of a simple, expeditious 
administrative (rather than judicial) procedure for hearing applications for compulsory 
licenses, and amendments to clarify royalty rates (section 4) and set time periods for 
negotiations (section 56).
123
    
The circumstances under which a non-government actor might apply to 
compulsorily acquire the right to a licence are rather less straightforward than the 
circumstances described above for the Government. A third party („any interested 
person‟
124
) is eligible to apply for a compulsory licence, where it can be shown that the 
right holder is abusing the patent. The conditions under which a patent will be deemed to 
be „abused‟ are set out in 56(2)(a)-(e) and are worth reproducing here: 
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(a)  the patented invention is not being worked in the Republic on a commercial 
scale or to an adequate extent…; 
(b)  the working of the invention in the Republic on a commercial scale or to an 
adequate extent is being prevented or hindered by the importation of the 
patented article; 
(c) the demand for the patented article in the Republic is not being met to an 
adequate extent and on reasonable terms; 
(d) by reason of the refusal of the patentee to grant a licence or licences upon 
reasonable terms, the trade or industry or agriculture of the Republic… is 
being prejudiced; and 
(e) the demand in the Republic for the patented article is being met by 
importation and the price charged by the patentee…for the patented article 
is excessive in relation to the price charged therefore in countries where the 
patented article is manufactured by or under licence from the patentee...” 
Abuse under one of the above provisions would prove challenging to establish in a judicial 
setting. On a pervasive level, it may be difficult to establish behaviour by a right holder 
which is consistent with a strong, emotive term as „abuse‟. At a more detailed level, the 
Patents Act should be expanded from the above list to explicitly include broader public-
health oriented circumstances which would justify a compulsory license.  
TRIPS does require efforts to be made to „obtain authorization from the right holder 
on reasonable commercial terms and conditions and that such efforts have not been 
successful within a reasonable period of time‟
125
 before a compulsory license may be 
granted. However, this requirement „may be waived by a Member in the case of a national 
emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of public non-
commercial use.
126
 Because the Doha Declaration confirms the right of Members to decide 
for themselves what constitutes a such circumstances, the TAC argues that South African 
legislation should broaden the above list to include issuing licenses if a medicine „remains 
inaccessible due to its cost, where patent holders refuse to grant voluntary licenses on 
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reasonable terms, and where there is a need for a novel fixed dose combination medicine 
comprising ingredients patented by multiple rights holders.‟
127
   
The current framework is overly complicated. A more simplified administrative 
framework is necessary because bringing claims to a court is expensive and time 
consuming, obstacles which are only intensified when the opposing side will (often) be a 
well-resourced brand-name pharmaceutical company. One commentator points out the 
irony that these arrangements are so burdensome and administratively complex, given that 
the WTO website maintains that its main function is to ensure that „trade flows as 
smoothly, predictably and freely as possible.‟
128
 Creating administrative, rather than 
judicial, mechanisms for interested persons to apply for a compulsory license not only 
reduces pressure on an already stretched judicial system, but enhances the likelihood that 
this TRIPS flexibility is invoked to address public health challenges.  
The political context for compulsory licensing 
The administrative and technical difficulties in using compulsory licenses only 
partly explain the broad underuse of the measures. The political pressures not to use 
compulsory licenses, by industry and other governments, also go some way in explaining 
their under use. Despite the clear legal foundations for granting compulsory licenses, as 
outlined in above sections, many developing countries remain reluctant, by and large, to 
pursue compulsory licenses.  Fear of trade retaliation remains a not-imagined threat. 
Reactions by drug companies may include, and has included in the past, threats to 
withdraw investments, declining to bring forecast products into the country, and even 
withdrawal altogether from certain countries.
129
  
In respect of government responses, the experience of Thailand in invoking 
compulsory licenses (described in more detail below), for example, does not provide 
confidence to developing countries. Following the issue of a number of compulsory 
licenses in 2007, the US placed Thailand on its Section 301 „Priority Watch List‟ in 2007, 
and threatened to withdraw its trade preferences in other areas afforded under the 
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Generalised System of Preferences.
130
 Yet other scholars argue that while such trade 
retaliation (especially unilateral) represents a very real threat to export markets for 
developing counties, developing countries should be aware that such action is often 
unfounded, in a legal sense. Reichman contends that if such a conflict was examined by 
WTO dispute settlement bodies, it would rather likely be retaliating state which would be 




Furthermore, the point that compulsory licensing is a mechanism open to all 
countries needs to be reinforced. All WTO members, as parties to TRIPS, are able to make 
use of compulsory licenses under the terms outlined above. Indeed, developed countries 
have been among the most prolific users of the flexibilities. Canada, for example, used 
threat of compulsory licensing to negotiate a licence for a H1N1 vaccine, (Tamiflu),
132
 and 
the United States has successfully threatened to invoke a compulsory licence to negotiate 




Some developed, along with developing, countries have enacted comprehensive 
legislation to better facilitate the use of c mpulsory licensing where required. Belgium, 
Switzerland and France, for instance, have all entrenched public health as grounds for 
compulsory licensing in their patents legislation.
 134
 The Swiss Patents Act provides the 
explicit justification for compulsory licensing for persons who have attempted to gain a 
license from a patent holder, but were not provided adequate justification for refusal, based 
on „public interest‟ grounds.
135
 And Belgian compulsory licensing is open to any person 
who can demonstrate that he or she has bona fide resources or intention to obtain necessary 
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resources for the continued manufacture in Belgium, on public health grounds.
136
 These 
examples can be drawn on to model and justify expanding the grounds for compulsory 
licensing in South Africa.  
In putting forward proposals for an enhanced compulsory licensing framework, 
there will likely be objections raised that the compulsory licenses are bad for investment, 
innovation incentives, research, and development.
137
 Against such claims however, is the 
claim that any such impact is minimal, because costs of research and development for 
drugs is exaggerated, where medicines are developed and tested with the developed world 
in mind.
138
 Another author proposes that negative impacts on investor confidence might be 
mitigated by countries working collaboratively on licenses on patents of mutual interest.
139
 
Through collective action, it might be possible for countries with relative level of FDI 
immunity (middle income countries like South Africa, for instance) to share that immunity 
with other countries more susceptible to FDI economic retribution.
140
  
South Africa as an exporter of medicines manufactured under compulsory licence?  
Aside from the direct benefits potentially flowing to South Africa in being able to 
more simply acquire compulsory licences for importing or manufacturing medicines, South 
Africa also has a potential role to play in supporting access to medicines priorities of other 
developing countries.  
Until 2003, WTO compulsory licensing arrangements only applied to countries to 
compulsorily acquire licences to manufacture medicines in their own territories.
141
 Because 
many developing countries lack the skills, resources and infrastructure necessary to 
manufacture drugs, compulsory licensing arrangements under TRIPS represented a 
redundant opportunity for those countries. Recognising this important flaw, the Doha 
Declaration acknowledged that WTO Members with insufficient no manufacturing 
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capacities in the pharmaceutical sector could face difficulties in making effective use of 
compulsory licensing under the TRIPS Agreement or, and instructing the Council for 
TRIPS to find an expeditious solution to that problem.
142
 The resolution of this problem by 
the WTO took the form of a decision by the General Council entitled „Implementation of 
paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, or the 
„Paragraph 6 decision‟.  
The crux of the Paragraph 6 decision is a set of conditions under which least 
developed countries, with insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical 
sector may nonetheless gain a compulsory license to import from another generic 
manufacturing Member.
143
 These arrangements in theory address an important problem in 
TRIPS, but in practice they have not been productive.
144
 Technically furthermore, the 
Paragraph 6 decision has not been accepted by the requisite two thirds WTO members to 
bring it into effect.
145
  
Reasons for the reluctance of countries to make use of this mechanism might 
include the fact that Members must meet strict burdens of proof that they are an eligible 
least developed country [Paragraph 2(a)(ii)], the rigorous labelling requirements of 
medicines produced in such a way [Paragraph 2(b)(ii)], and the final burdensome 
requirements that importing countries then ensure that the products are not subsequently re-
exported [Paragraph 4].   
Implementing legislation to give effect to this flexibility (again, at an 
administrative, rather than judicial level), would likely help encourage generic 
manufacturers and health organisations to make use of the mechanism. There is nothing in 
the Patents Act which should prevent South Africa from manufacturing and exporting 
essential medicines to countries which do not have sufficient manufacturing capacity; but 
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nonetheless a specific provision which allows it should be inserted.
146
 South Africa should 
at the same time maintain pressure in the WTO to simplify these procedures or at least 
provide model guidelines for implementation.  
Such an ability to export drugs to South Africa‟s LDC neighbours (those with no or 
insufficient manufacturing capacity) presents not only an immediate public health benefit 
for those LDC countries, but it also would help achieve economies of scale for a 
burgeoning South African generics industry. Economies of scale in this respect, suggests 
UNCTAD, is achieved by approaching groupings of countries to pool procurement 
activities and compulsory licensing activities for the same list of 
medicines.
147
Collaborating in this way is facilitated in LDC-dominated regional trade 




Brazil has a compulsory licensing framework which is often cited as an 
encouraging model for other developing countries. Brazil has become notorious for the 
successful use of compulsory licenses to manufacture a number of drugs to address its most 
pressing public health challenges.  
The success of Brazil‟s AIDS treatment programs, for example (between 1996 and 
2002 AIDS-related mortality was reduced by 50 per cent), has been attributed to its ability 
to manufacture medicines locally, and cheaply, under compulsory license, or threat of 
compulsory license which has resulted in negotiated licenses.
149
 Brazil first used the threat 
of compulsory licensing to achieve significant price reductions on HIV medicine, efaviranz 
and nelfinavir in 2001, moving on to similar price reductions on lopinavir in 2003; the 
lopinavir/ritonavir combination in 2005; and tenofovir in 2006.
150
 Brazil finally used a 
compulsory license (rather than the threat of one) in 2007 to allow the import and 
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production of generic versions of efavirenz, leading to a drop from 580 USD per 
patient/per year from the brand name to 165 USD for the generic version.
151
 
Notwithstanding resistance from some parts of the pharmaceutical sector, and 
certainly from international pharma groups, Brazil has enjoyed a level of support from a 
relatively sizeable proportion of the local pharmaceutical sector in pursuing its compulsory 
licensing strategy. One commentator has attributed this to the significant support the 
government has provided the sector, including through investing heavily in research; 
maintaining public sector labs in partnership with suppliers; supporting private firms to 
develop necessary intermediates; and assisting firms to acquire capacities for reverse-
engineering of APIs.
152
 South Africa should consider these wider measures to support a 
more active compulsory licensing system.  
It must be noted that part of Brazil‟s success can be placed on its relative size, and 
status as an innovative developing country, with a significant capacity to manufacture 
pharmaceutical products – not all developing countries could follow through on such 
threats. But South Africa; the only country in southern Africa with a well-established 
pharmaceutical manufacturing industry, and with an (albeit limited) capacity to 
manufacture APIs,
153
 is also well-positioned to make similar stands, and replicate Brazil‟s 
example.  
Thailand 
Thailand‟s compulsory licensing framework also has some appealing features. 
Thailand‟s standing as a compulsory licenser began in late 2006 and early 2007, when it 
issued compulsory licenses for two HIV drugs (Efavirenz and Kaletra) and one heart 
disease drug (Plavix). These compulsory licenses were made on the grounds that they were 
not affordable. While the Thai government came under criticism for not following the 
Article 31TRIPS requirement (that before a compulsory license is entered into, negotiations 
must take place),
154
 the Government retorted that such negotiation was not required 
                                                             
151 t‟Hoen, E op cit, p 45.  
152 Shadlen, K, „The Politics of patents and drugs in Brazil and Mexico: The industrial bases of health 
policies‟ Comparative Politics (Tufts), October 2009, p 50.  
153 Avafia, T, Berger J and Hartzenberg T, op cit, p 3.  
154 Article 31(b) TRIPS requires that the proposed user has made efforts to obtain authorization from the right 










Page 54 of 73 
 
because it its generic manufacturing was destined for non-commercial purposes.
155
 The 
USTR, however, reacted strongly, but in response to significant public and even 
congressional pressures to respect Thailand‟s moves, eventually conceded that „We have 




In response to the controversy facing his country over the issuing of compulsory 
licenses, the Thai Minister for Public Health nicely summed up the non-sequitur concerns 
from commercial sectors as follows:  
„When a government such as ours declares a “compulsory license” to allow for 
public non-commercial use of patented products by the government for the greater 
public good, we are doing so to increase access to these essential, often life-saving, 
medications for the poor and marginalized members of our communities who were 
not consumers of these expensive, patented drugs. The more well-off members of 
our society continue to consult their own private physicians and continue to pay – 
out of their own pockets – the price of patented medications. Thus, both the patent 
and compulsory license for the same product can exist harmoniously side by side in 
a country such as Thailand, with maximum benefits for all.‟
157
 
This same reasoning applies in South Africa, where the production of essential medicine 
generics represent little, if any, loss of market for brand name companies. Of further 
interest for South Africa is the determination Thailand has shown to issue compulsory 
licenses for a range of illnesses. Unlike the general trend with compulsory licenses, where 
licenses have by and large been granted on drugs to address HIV/AIDS,
158
 Thailand has 
quickly become the most prolific user of compulsory licenses for non-communicable 
diseases (NCDs).
159
 As host to the world‟s largest population of HIV infected 
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 effective compulsory licensing on HIV drugs will obviously be a priority for 
South Africa. But it is also important, as the greatest burden of disease in Africa is set to 
shift in coming years to NCDs,
161
 that South Africa adopt a longer-term vision. This should 
not involve the development of an exhaustive list of diseases against which compulsory 
licenses might be invoked, but rather a flexible framework which provides South Africa 
with the freedom to grant CLs on any health grounds which the country is facing. 
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Chapter 5: Resisting TRIPS plus provisions: Data exclusivity / patent linkage  
Unlike the measures described in other chapters, the measures of data exclusivity 
and patent linkage do not appear in TRIPS, and it is not proposed that these measures be 
incorporated into South African law. The purpose of including this chapter in the 
dissertation rather, is precautionary. These two measures are emerging as increasingly 
common provisions in trade agreements to expand patent protection, and thus restrict 
further access to medicines. Because they are seen as granting protection which goes 
beyond what the minimum standards require under TRIPS, they are often referred to as 
„TRIPS Plus‟ measures. In the pharmaceutical field, TRIPS Plus measures cover an array 
of IP measures, such as patent term extensions for certain classes of medicines, regulatory 
protections, undertakings not to use compulsory licences, except under very limited 
circumstances; and more limited circumstances for the revocation of patents.  
While all these measures should be resisted, this chapter covers detail of just two 
examples: data exclusivity clauses and patent linkage, for their particularly perverse 
potential to restrict access to medicines, and because of their increasing popularity in 
PTAs. As South Africa negotiates trade agreements with a number of countries, it is 
important that the Government remain vigilant against these negative implications, and 
refuse their inclusion.  
Data exclusivity 
Data exclusivity, in the pharmaceutical context, refers to the process by which data, 
which is submitted by originator drug manufacturer as part of its application to gain 
marketing approval, may not be used by generic manufacturers, also for the purpose of 
gaining marketing approval, for a specified period of time. Because it is economically and, 
some argue, ethically, unfeasible for generic manufacturers to produce original data to 
prove efficacy and safety, generic manufacturers generally rely on the same test data as is 
submitted to relevant authorities for the originator drug.  
Protection of such undisclosed data, when required for marketing approval 
processes, must be protected against „unfair commercial use‟ by TRIPS,
162
 but 
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specification on timeframes or what constitutes unfair commercial are not made.  The 
language of this provision would seem not to apply to government sponsored (non 
commercial) use generic manufacturing. Furthermore, some argue that this TRIPS 
provision ought only to apply to prevent third parties from using the data except where 
some unfair (dishonest) practices are involved.
163
 Protection of test data against the 
legitimate attempts of generic manufacturers to register generic versions after the expiry of 
the patent for the originator therefore, under that line of argument, would not be included.  
Yet PTAs often lock in protection for specified periods after it is submitted. 
Depending on the length of data protection required, and when the original data was first 
submitted, data protection provisions are harmful for access because the effective life of the 
monopoly on a drug can be extended through such protection. For example, where data 
protection by authorities is required for a period of five years, yet data for its marketing 
approval is only submitted to relevant authorities for a particular drug 17 years after the 
grant of the patent, generic manufacturers are effectively blocked out of the market for an 
additional two years after the expiry of the patent, because generic manufacturers cannot 
use the data for part of the approval process.  
Because protection of test data is not required under TRIPS, except in 
circumstances of unfair commercial use, South Africa should avoid limiting future policy 
space in this area by including it in any PTAs it negotiates because it has the potential to 
restrict the entry of generics.  
Patent linkage 
Broadly, the term „patent linkage‟ refers to the connecting in any way of the patent 
status of a drug to the regulatory, or marketing, approval of that same drug. At its strongest, 
patent linkage can preclude the regulatory approval of a drug if there is a possibility that it 
may infringe a patent. In most countries, the patents office, which concerns itself with the 
patentability of medicines, is separate from the marketing approval bodies, which concerns 
itself with the safety and efficacy of a drug, and often has links to the health ministry.  
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This separation is the case in the South African context, where patent linkage is not 
currently provided for in South African law. It will be important to maintain the separation 
of these two different processes into the future. Pharmaceutical patent linkage is becoming 
increasingly widespread, not only in incidence, but also in scope.
164
 Since the expansion of 
linkage has the potential to impact not only domestic IP, but also the movement of drugs 
for humanitarian reasons,
165
 it is worth considering its potentially deleterious effects.  It is 
not a distant possibility that South Africa will be asked at some stage to incorporate them in 
bilateral or regional trade agreements, if it has not already.  
Patent linkage provision vary, but generally work in two ways to prevent the entry 
of generics: by precluding the regulatory approval of a drug if would infringe a patent, and 
often by requiring that regulatory authorities notify the original patent holder if a generic 
manufacturer is seeking approval. This is problematic for access to medicines because it 
has the potential to delay registration of essential medicines under spurious or frivolous IP 
claims. 
The Australia-US Free Trade Agreement, for example, required that regulatory 
authorities, where they require, as part of marketing approval processes the provision of 
test data, to provide measures to prevent marketing, where that product is claimed in a 
patent.
166
 Where an application is made for marketing approval for a drug which is affected 
by a patent, the applicant is required to submit certification to the effect it is acting in good 
faith, believes on reasonable grounds that it is not marketing, and does not propose to 
market, the therapeutic goods in a manner, or in circumstances, that would infringe a valid 
claim of a patent.
167
 These burdensome requirements have been criticised for unnecessarily 
confusing the role of regulatory and patents agencies and discouraging generic entry. The 
negative effects of this particular provision were partially mitigated during implementation 
by the insertion of a reciprocal requirement on patent holders who instigate litigation 
against generic entry; requiring certification that any such litigation is commenced in good 
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Nonetheless, in a developing country context in South Africa, where the expansion 
of a viable generics industry should be a national priority (as discussed in Chapter 1), 
linking the marketing approval process to patent linkages in such a complex manner would 
insert an unnecessary level of administrative burden and potential barriers to generic 
market entry, which is not required under TRIPS, and which potential provides additional 
avenues for encouraging litigation against generic entry.  
Resisting TRIPS Plus measures in trade agreements 
Countries are theoretically free to implement TRIPS plus measures, although 
provisions requiring them are more likely to appear in national legislation as a result of 
external pressure (generally by way of implementation requirements associated with 
PTAs).
169
 In PTA negotiations, developing countries are often are often asked to implement 
stronger IP protection rules in exchange for market access in other areas in developed 
countries, and, as it has been pointed out, any country which wants to improve its export 
market will be vulnerable to pressure to modify its patent protection framework.
170
  
An additional point of concern is the fact that the standard of protection seems to be 
increasing over time with each new PTA that is concluded. For example, while the Jordan-
US FTA calls for the protection of „undisclosed test or other data‟, more recent FTAs with 
the US refer broadly to „information‟ which would seem to imply that protection should be 
extended to test data even where that information has become public.
171
  
In summary, while South Africa does not have these TRIPS plus provisions 
integrated into its patent framework, it is necessary to be vigilant against their introduction 
by way of PTA or other pressure. The measures of data protection and patent linkage have 
the potential to restrict and delay the entry of generic medicines. As argued in this 
dissertation, better and more generic competition in generic manufacturing should be a 
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Conclusion – the way forward  
South Africa needs to enhance its ability to take measures to ensure access to 
reliable, safe and affordable medicines. The challenges faced by South Africa against HIV 
and related illness are well documented – and the improvements in access to HIV 
medicines eventually achieved through the exercise of TRIPS flexibilities are inspiring. But 
South Africa is entitled, under international law, and compelled, under the constitution, to 
take more steps to protect and promote measures aimed not just at the big well known 
threats, but any public health challenges. Through harnessing intellectual property to 
achieve better medicines access then, this dissertation argues that South Africa must 
 introduce and enforce stricter standards of patentability, so that only those 
new medicines which are truly innovative , representing an enhanced 
therapeutic effectiveness over existing treatments, are granted a patent; 
 introduce pre- and post-grant opposition to patents; and administrative 
procedures for third parties to challenge a patent outside the court system; 
 introduce a more flexible and user-friendly compulsory licensing 
framework, specifically legislating for a wider range of circumstances under 
which a compulsory licence may be granted; and   
 resist pressure to implement data exclusivity, patent linkage and other 
TRIPS plus provisions.  
These measures should by no means be considered to represent an exhaustive list of 
the intellectual property measures which are needed. But they are a very good starting point 
and will be pursued by TAC and other public interest groups as they push the South 
African Government in 2012 and beyond to amend the Patents Act. These organisations 
will argue that now is the time to take measures to protect public health enshrined in 
Constitution and under international law. They will argue that it is time to hold the 
government to account of its constitutional obligation to ensure access to life saving 
medicines in South Africa.
172
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Some commentators have lamented the lack of commitment to public health 
promotion in intellectual property policy making in South Africa. One study, which 
considers the extent to which IP can be harnessed for development, concludes that 
unfortunately, national and international and decision-making on IP policy in Africa are all 
too often based on „false perceptions, unrealistic expectations, insufficient knowledge, and 
a lack of awareness and public responsibility.‟
173
 South Africa, as it revises the patent 
framework, must inform itself of the true costs of IP protection and opportunities for 
development of a flexible framework.  
Other countries, particularly and in several ways, India, have lead by example. 
However, as one commentator has pointed out, „India provides not only an example of how 
to fashion patent laws to promote access to medicine, but how to provoke the ire, 
controversy, and expense of litigation with wealthy companies. It remains to be seen 
whether India has the political will to maintain the patent laws it designed‟.
174
  
Making such moves then, will require sustained commitment and determination on 
the part of the South African Government; many international actors, such as the US, EU 
and multinational brand name pharmaceutical companies have not shown a tendency to shy 
away from instances where countries have exercised their TRIPS flexibilities, even in the 
face of massive outcries from civil society and humanitarian sectors. But it is important to 
recall that none of the amendments suggested in this dissertation are radical proposals – all 
are provided for under international law and can be defended as such.  
Costs in implementing these proposed measures will need to be considered. Closer 
patent application examination, experts to consider pre- and post-grant oppositions, 
administrative costs in a compulsory licensing scheme which is more open to applicants – 
these will all require additional budgetary allocations. Some options for minimising costs 
have been presented in this dissertation, for example, by using a list of experts to consider 
patentability disputes where needed, rather than maintaining a permanent structure. South 
Africa might also recoup some of its costs by petitioning more intently that developed 
countries, in the WTO, to fulfil their obligations to assist developing and least developed 
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member states with TRIPS implementation in the areas of capacity building and legislative 
assistance. Other costs, however, should be considered against the potentially significant 
savings (in a direct economic sense, as well as the flow-on economic benefits of a healthier 
society) achieved through a patents system more geared towards protecting and promoting 
public health.  
Finally, a recognition must be stated that intellectual property is just one part of a 
broader suite of changes that needs to be made to enhance access to medicines. An 
oversimplification of the access to medicines crisis as all down to patent access would be 
unhelpful, and unfair. But, to borrow again from Dr Mirza, "We recognize that they [the 
TRIPS flexibilities] are not the simplest mechanisms to use...but it's a tool that we can use 
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